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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Special Administrator of Estate 
ofT. 0. Nelson 
Plwintiff arnd Appellarnt 
-vs.-
MAX ROSENLOF, and \ 
MAX ROSENLOF 
CONSTRUCTION CO., J 
a partnership 
Defenda%t arnd Respondent , 
Case 
No. 9348 
BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In this case the plaintiff, T. 0. Nelson, is deceased but 
to assist in the clarity of this presentation the word 
"plain tiff" shall mean " T. 0. Nelson. " 
On or about March 3, 1958, the plaintiff and defend-
ant executed a written subcontract agreement (copy at-
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tached to the complaint) by which the plaintiff, as a sub-
contractor, undertook to do essentially all of the form-
ing and placing of all concrete for the Lehi High School 
Building for which the defendant as ''General Con-
tractor" had been awarded the general contract by the 
Alpine School District as "Owner." The plaintiff en-
tered into the performance of this contract immediately 
and to get money for the ''move on'' costs the plaintiff 
borrowed $1,000.00 from Geneva Rock Products Com-
pany, and the defendant cosigned the note with the 
plaintiff. 
The work progressed until September 10, 1958, when 
the defendant was excluded from the job site by the de-
fendant and plaintiff's foreman was fired and the rest of 
his employees were put on defendant's payroll. The de-
fendant alleged that plaintiff had "abandoned" the job. 
The lower court found that plaintiff had abandoned 
the job. 
On or about September 16, 1958, the defendant 
through his attorney notified plaintiff that he was taking 
over the cement work pursuant to paragraph three of 
the subcontract. On or about September 25, 1958, the 
plaintiff through his attorney demanded the retur:tJ. of all 
his tools, concrete forms, and materials from the defend-
ant and controverted defendant's claim of abandonment. 
The plaintiff filed an action in the District Court of 
Utah County against the defendant and upon the issues 
made the matter was tried and the court found that the 
defendant had converted the plaintiff's tools, forms, 
equipment and materials. The court also found that de-
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fendant was entitled to certain offsetting charges which 
had the effect of giving a judgment to the defendant. 
The plaintiff filed his motions for new trial, or to 
reopen the case to present evidence of value of his form-
ing equipment, and to amend the findings of fact and 
conclusions of Law and Judgment. The lower court de-
nied plaintiff's motions, and plaintiff now prosecutes 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE COURT ERRED BY ITS FAILURE TO 
GIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE WRIT-
TEN CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES. 
PoiNT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDING OF VALUE OF THE 
FORMSCONVERTEDBYDEFENDANTAND 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
EITHER REOPEN THE CASE OR AMEND 
ITS FINDINGS. 
PoiNT III 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING 
OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF ABAN-
DONED HIS CONTRACT BUT CONTRARY-
WISE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS FORCED OFF THE JOB BY 
DEFENDANT. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED BY ITS FAILURE TO 
GIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE WRIT-
TEN CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES. 
The particular items in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law involved in this point are contained 
in paragraph six and totals $7,569.00 for work allegedly 
done by the defendant and covered in plaintiff's sub-
contract, to wit: 
Creative Terrazzo --------------------------------$ 178.00 
Crane Rental ------------------------------------------$3,588.50 
Columns and beams in pan area ________ $2,251.50 
Beams in administrative area ------------$1,551.00 
In paragraph one of the Subcontract Agreement it 
is stated ''The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree 
to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, 
construction regulations, general conditions, plans and 
specifications, and any and all other contract documents, 
if any there be, insofar as applicable to this subcontract 
agreement ... " Plaintiff's Exhibit Two is the "Speci-
fications Senior High School Alpine School District, 
American Fork, Utah.'' Article Two, paragraph D of 
these ''Specifications'' makes the general conditions 
apply to "subcontractors" with equal force; then in 
Article Thirty-Seven there are specific provisions which 
govern the relationship of the contractor and subcon-
traetor, and puts the duty upon the contractor to do 
certain things in respect to his subcontractors. In this 
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connection Article 37 D ( 8) provides : ''No claim is valid 
(against the subcontractor by the contractor) unless sub-
mitted in writing within the first 10 days of the next 
month after the work is done.'' 
The almost obvious purpose for such a provision in 
the contract is to prevent the contractor from'' trapping'' 
the subcontractor by accumulated claims at a time when 
all evidence is gone and the opportunity of proving or 
disproving such a claim is practically impossible. The 
General Contractor in a large construction job such as 
this is in a superior position, and as a substantial and 
solid protection to the subcontractor the contract pro-
vided that No Cla,im should be valid unless submitted in 
writing at the time when the facts were available to 
both sides. 
The defendant admitted at trial that he had not billed 
the plaintiff for any of the items set out above until 10 
days before the trial of this case ( TRS 143, l. 15-20) 
which was approximately fourteen months after the 
alleged work was done. In fact, the defendant did not 
include the items set out under this point in his counter-
claim filed in this case, the items appearing only at the 
very time of trial. 
The importance of this provision has particular sig-
nificance in respect to the crane work because the contract 
provides in paragraph one, ''The General Contractor 
shall be responsible for the following: 
1. Excavation to grade lines, pumping water from 
forms, furnishing of a crane or other suitable 
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means of elevating concrete to forms where neces-
sary above finished floor.'' 
The term ''finished floor'' has no particular certain 
meaning because the building has finished floors at 
every level (TRS 57, l. 23-25; p. 59, l. 6-12; p. 141, l. 27; 
p. 142, l. 19), and the contract meaning must be inter-
preted. Thus without receiving any crane billing from the 
defendant the plaintiff did not know that the defendant 
was accumulating such a charge under his own inter-
pretation of the contract language. Also, in respect to 
the forming in the pan area and administration area, the 
plaintiff testified that these areas were formed by the 
defendant as an exchange of work and in payment by 
defendant for the use of the plaintiff's equipment (TRS 
96, l. 24-30 ; TRS 97, l. 1-16). Again this alleged work 
was not billed to the plaintiff at any time, and did not 
appear in the counter claim of the defendant until a few 
days before trial which was at least 14 months after the 
work was performed. 
By definition a contract is ''An agreement or obliga-
tion enforceable by law to do something or to refrain 
from doing something" (17 C.J.S. 1) and further, "A 
contract must be construed as a whole and, whenever 
possible, effect will be given to all its parts," and "writ-
ings which are made a part of a contract by annexation or 
reference must be so construed,'' and, ''plans and speci-
fications, if not contained in the contract itself, but re-
ferred to therein or annexed thereto, must he construed 
therewith." (17 C. J. S. 327). 
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In the case of Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty 
Company, 168 P. 966, 5- U. 78, this court said: 
''A court will not resort to construction where the 
intent of the parties is expressed in clear and un-
ambiguous language, but will enforce or give effect 
to the contract according to its terms.'' 
And again in the case of Middleton v. Eva;ns, 45 P. 
2d 570 86 U. 396, this court said : 
''The intention of the parties is to be deduced from 
the language employed by them, and the rule mak-
ing the terms of the contract conclusive where 
unambiguous is controlling.'' 
The provisions of the contract contained in Article 
37-d-(8) are unambiguous and mandatory in its phrasing 
that no claim shall be valid unless submitted in writing 
within the first 10 days of the next month after the work 
is done. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDING OF VALUE OF THE 
FORMSCONVERTEDBYDEFENDANTAND 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
EITHER REOPEN THE CASE OR AMEND 
ITS FINDINGS. 
The court made a finding that the defendant had con-
verted the forms of the plaintiff in March, 1959, and that 
they had a value of $4,000.00 at the time of conversion. 
The value of $4,000.00 came from the unsupported testi-
mony of the defendant ( TRS 138, l. 27-30). 
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In Exhibit 4, the plaintiff set out the invoices cover-
ing the actual acquisition cost of the forms converted 
which totals $17,707.49. Then using the tabulation set out 
in paragraph 2 (c) of plaintiff's first answer to inter-
rogatories the plaintiff showed that the first forms pur-
chased cost $37.80 each for a 2' x 8' panel and that the 
last 2' x 8' panels purchased (some seven thousand dol-
lars' worth purchased especially for the Lehi High 
School job), cost in excess of $57.00 each (See Exhibit 4) 
(TRS 21, l. 21-30, also p. 22, 23, 24, and 25, l. 1-8). The 
plaintiff then went on to establish the average "value" 
of the large panels at $45.00 and the filler panels at their 
acquisition cost, thus totaling $20,071.85. It also appears 
in the evidence, and is not controverted, that these partic-
ular prefabricated concrete forms had a life of one thou-
sand "pours," and that on the Lehi job it would require 
from ten to not to exceed sixteen ''pours'' to complete 
the job (TRS 72, l. 26-30; 73, l. 1-29). Thus the new 
forms purchased at the start of the Lehi job would have 
only been used for about sixteen pours whereas their ex-
pected life would be one thousand pours. 
The defendant in his argument to the trial court and 
in his memorandum brief took the position that the plain-
tiff could not recover for the converted forms because he 
had failed to prove a "Market Value" on the forms cit-
ing Ha,ycroft v. Adams, 82 U. 347, 24 P. 2d 1110, and 
Knighton v. Ma;nrn.in.g, 84 U. 1, 33 P. 2d 401, as authority. 
If the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient because it was not 
of such a nature as would support a deduction as to what 
the market value of the forms was, then the defendant's 
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evidence was totally insufficient to support the court's 
finding of a $4,000.00 value. The only evidence produced 
by the defendant as to value is his totally unsupported 
statement found on page 138 of the transcript, line 30, 
as follows: 
''I would not appraise them over $4,000.00.'' 
In the later case of Lynn v. Thompson, 112 U. 24, 184 
P. 2d 667, this court said : 
''The acceptance by the court of the cost of the 
tubes to the plaintiff may have been a recognition 
of the fact that such cost closely approximated 
the present market price of such pipe ; or he may 
have merely accepted that cost as the most equi-
table, and reliable way of fixing the amount of the 
damages suffered. In either case his actions were 
proper.'' 
In the case at bar the plaintiff produced cost in-
voices (a clear reflection of market price) to the time 
when the Lehi School job started (March 1958) which 
shows the market price almost doubling in the period of 
three years. The defendant testified that the average 
value of the large panels was $45.00 each and that the 
filler panels were the same value as their cost since these 
items were two to three years old. Certainly the evidence 
is sufficint from which a "Market Value" could be 
deduced. 
At this point in the proceedings below when the court 
had chosen to adopt the statement of the defendant as 
to the value of the forms converted, the plaintiff filed his 
motion, supported by affidavits, to amend the Findings 
of the Court or to reopen for the purpose of producing 
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additional evidence as to damages for the conversion. 
The denial of plaintiff's motion to amend or to reopen 
constitutes an error of law and should not stand. 
PoiNT III 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING 
OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF ABAN-
DONED HIS CONTRACT BUT CONTRARY-
WISE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS FORCED OFF THE JOB BY 
DEFENDANT. 
At the outset of the subcontract the defendant knew 
that plaintiff did not have any working capital and thus 
cosigned with him to obtain $1,000 from Geneva Rock 
Products Co. (TRS 149 1. 11-217). The defendant knew 
that plaintiff would incur large initial costs on the job 
which would be spread over the entire job. Defendant 
also knew that plaintiff must have his payments promptly 
for work completed. 
The defendant asserted no right to hold back money 
and computed the amount due to plaintiff on the basis of 
$10.00 per cubic yard of concrete poured (TRS 149, L 
22-28). The plaintiff stated that the basis of payment 
was to be at the rate of $10.00 per cubic yard and that 
there would not be any hold back (TRS 62, I. 21-28). 
The contract between the parties required the de-
fendant to promptly pay the plaintiff-subcontractor his 
proportion of each estimate submitted by the contractor 
to the Aipine School District (See Exhibit 2 ''General 
10 
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Conditions" Article 37-D-1). Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 is 
the monthly ''completion certificates'' executed by Max 
Rosenlof and approved by the Inspector, Mr. Chatfield, 
and the Architect, Fred W. Needham. To determine the 
proportion of plaintiff's work, Item 46, ''Concrete and 
Forming,'' has been extracted and the percentage rela-
tionship of each monthly estimate to the total contract 
price has been computed and the percentage figure a p-
plied arithmetically to the amounts mentioned in the 
subcontract. Thus, for example : The Total contract price 
for ''Concrete and Forming'' was $156,056.00; the esti-
mate submitted for the work done by the end of Septem-
ber, 1958, was $134,220.00; 134 over 156 equals 86% ; thus 
the defendant certified that 86% of the concrete and form-
ing had been completed, and therefore the plaintiff was 
entitled to 86% of his contract price at that time. The 
complete computation is set out below: 
_W_o_rk___;,...do_n....;.e..;~;.p...;.e_r .;..;ce;..;.rt=if=ic=a;..;..;te;.__% Ratio 
March '58, 15,000/156,000.......... 09.61% 
April '58, 35,800/156,000____________ 22.94% 
May '58, 67,000/156,000............ 42.94% 
June '58, 83,800/156,000............ 53.84% 
July '58, 105,000/156,000............ 67.30% 
August '58, 120,000/156,000 ...... 76.923% 
September '58, 134,000/156,000 86.01% 
October '58, 141,000/156,000 ...... 90.384% 
November '58, 143,000/156,000 .. 92.307% 
Contract 
Price 
$51,000 
$ 4,896.00 
11,679.00 
21,930.00 
27,540.00 
34,170.00 
39,270.00 
43,860.00 
45,900.00 
46,920.00 
Total 
Contract 
$56,820.00 
$ 5,454.72 
16,477.00 
24,435.00 
30,682.28 
38,086.40 
43,861.40 
47,865.20 
51,138.00 
52,274.40 
The defendant asserted that he was not holding back 
any payments and that he was making payments based 
upon $10.00 per cubic yard poured. On Sept. 10, 1958, 
it has been established that 4367 cubic yards had been 
poured. Upon the basis of the contract and the admitted 
policy of the defendant under the contract the plaintiff 
11 
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was entitled to at least $43,670.00 by September 10, 1958, 
and upon the basis of the entire job he was entitled to 
$47,865.20. The defendant had received the money from 
the School Board and was obligated to pay plaintiff. The 
total amount that had been paid to plaintiff by the end 
of September, 1958, was $35,040.00, thus leaving $8,630.00 
due under the most conservative construction of the con-
tract between the parties. The total amount of obliga-
tion of the plaintiff on the job at this time was $5,904.39, 
which included "snap ties" sufficient to finish the entire 
job and capital items of lumber totaling $670.00 (see 
stipulated unpaid bills). 
The defendant knew that the plaintiff needed prompt 
and full payment of the amounts due to him in order 
to keep up with the high cost of the first part of the job. 
The defendant alleges that there was a critical situ~tion 
and that the creditors were closing in on the plaintiff, 
however, all of the bills which were unpaid at the time 
when the plaintiff was excluded from the job remained 
unpaid at the time of trial. 
If the defendant had paid the plaintiff as he said 
he would do and as required by the contract, there would 
not have been any stress. The preponderance of the evi-
dence establishes the fact that plaintiff was forced off 
the job. Plaintiff's men, foreman, materials and equip-
ment were on the job when defendant commandeered 
them. All the evidence supports the contention of a force-
ful taking by defendant based upon an excuse fabricated 
and created by defendant's own failure to pay plaintiff 
as promised and required. 
12 
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The majority of the work remaining to be done when 
defendant took over was flat work which is low cost and 
high profit work. It is the work in which the subcon-
tractor usually has his profit. The defendant said that his 
estimated cost to form and pour the remaining concrete 
was $4.45 per cubic yard (TRS 149, l. 3-6; p. 152, l. 10). 
In connection with the completion of the work by 
defendant it is to be noted that defendant asserted a right 
to take over pursuant to the provisions of paragraph three 
of the Subcontract Agreement. This paragraph requires 
that defendant ''complete the work ... in the most eco-
nomical manner available to him at the time." At the 
time plaintiff was excluded from the job the work was 
approximately 85% completed (see Exhibit 10) and the 
evidence is to the effect that plaintiff had enough lumber 
and shap-ties on the job to complete the contract (TRS 
45, l. 29-30; 46, 1.1-14; 42, l. 21-30; 43, l.l-7). The total 
lumber purchased by the plaintiff was $2815.51 ( TRS 15, 
1. 4-16) for 85% of the job. However, defendant claimed 
that he bought $3820.00 worth of lumber to complete 15% 
of the job (TRS 137,. l. 27-30; 138, l. 1-7) and that it was 
all totally consumed. The plaintiff and his witnesses as-
serted that very little of the lumber is consumed by the 
framing and pouring process but that the majority could 
be used over and over ( TRS 12, l. 17-30 ; 13, l. 1-3 ; 
45, l. 2-4). 
The evidence 1n this case clearly preponderate in 
favor of the plaintiff's contention that he was wrong-
fully excluded from the job and that the alleged purchase 
of materials by the defendant was not necessary to com-
13 
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plete the concrete work but must have been for other uses 
on the general construction job. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding of the court in paragraph 6 should be 
reversed and the specific provisions of the contract mak-
ing such claims invalid should be enforced. 
The finding of the court as to the value of the forms 
converted should be reversed and a new finding made 
that said forms were of the value of $20,071.85, or, in the 
alternative the case should be remanded for further trial 
on the question of value. 
The allowance by the court of the cost of materials to 
complete the job in the amount of $3820.00 should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
PETER M. LOWE 
Attorn.ey for Appellent 
103 Executive Building 
455 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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